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Truth and Provability – A Comment on Redhead 
 
Panu Raatikainen 
 
Michael Redhead puts forward, in his ambitious paper ‘Mathematics and the Mind’ 
(Redhead 2004), a simple argument which aims to show that humanly certifiable truth 
outruns provability. Redhead’s arguments require a comment.  
Redhead first discusses two possible answers to the question of how we know that 
the Gödel sentence G (for Peano Arithmetic PA) is true. He dismisses them both by 
stating that they presuppose that the axioms of PA are true. Strictly speaking, this is 
wrong – they only require that PA is consistent, which is a much weaker assumption. But 
Redhead is certainly on the right track in rebutting these strategies.1  
Redhead’s own argument focuses on the weaker Robinson Arithmetic Q 
(Redhead calls it, following Lucas, ‘sorites arithmetic’, but I prefer to use the standard 
name), which, unlike PA, does not have the induction scheme. His reason for this is that 
its axioms are ‘arguably analytic’: ‘If any of these axioms were false we would not be 
talking about numbers.’ Redhead contrasts them with the induction axiom (or scheme), 
which he calls ‘notorious’ and ‘more mysterious’. With a reference to Poincaré, he 
concludes that the induction scheme is not analytically true.  
Now the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic is famously elusive 
and problematic, but it is far from clear that the induction scheme is in any way less 
analytic than the other axioms. It is equivalent (assuming classical logic) to the least 
number principle, i.e. to the claim that if there exists a number with a property P, there 
exists the smallest number with the property P. But it is quite plausible to say that if this 
principle fails, one is not talking about natural numbers; in other words, that the principle, 
and hence, induction, is analytic in Redhead’s sense. 
But be that as it may, let us now consider Redhead’s main argument. It begins 
with the well-known fact that while 
 
For all pairs (m, n), it is provable in Q that m × n = n × m,    (1) 
 
holds, the following is not true: 
 
 It is provable in Q that for all pairs (m, n), m × n = n × m.   (2) 
 
The universal generalization  
 
For all pairs (m, n), m × n = n × m       (3) 
 
can be proved (e.g. in PA) with the help of the induction scheme, which Q does not have.  
Redhead next submits that we can argue – presumably without using the induction 
scheme – that (3) is nevertheless true. Redhead introduces the notion of truth (or, ‘is 
true’), and argues that since the axioms of Q are analytically true, we can replace (1) by 
  
 For all pairs (m, n), it is true that m × n = n × m,    (4) 
 
which, according to Redhead, is strictly equivalent to  
 
 It is true that for all pairs (m, n), m × n = n × m.    (5) 
 
By eliminating the truth predicate, one gets (3). Redhead concludes that we have here a 
case in which certifiable truth outruns provability.  
One problem with Redhead’s discussion is that he doesn’t make explicit which 
kind of notion of truth he is assuming in the above reasoning. His remarks at the end of 
the paper suggest that he has a Tarskian definition of truth in mind. However, such a 
definition can only be given in a sufficiently strong metatheory, a theory which must 
certainly contain the induction scheme. Hence there is a risk here that one smuggles in 
the very principle one is trying to avoid.  
However, the most serious problem in Readhead’s reasoning concerns (1) and the 
grounds of our knowledge of it. It is a statement about provability in Robinson 
Arithmetic Q, but this does not guarantee that it is itself provable in Q. And the fact is 
that it is provable only in a stronger metatheory, one which must have the induction 
scheme. Such a theory can directly prove (what Q cannot) also that for all pairs (m, n), m 
× n = n × m, that is, (3). The argument, and the appeal to the notion of truth, is redundant. 
Redhead’s argument thus assumes, already in the beginning, something that goes beyond 
Q. Without induction, on the other hand, we just can’t establish (1), the premise of the 
argument, and get the argument off the ground. I am afraid that one has no option but to 
conclude that the argument fails.  
At the end of his paper, Redhead proposes that unless one is constructivist, his 
arguments confirm the anti-mechanist conclusion similar to that of Lucas and Penrose 
that minds are not machines, i.e. that the powers of the human mind outrun any formal 
system (these are equivalent, for an axiomatizable formal system is by definition a system 
whose theorems can be mechanically generated by a finite machine). But given the 
problems of Redhead’s argument pointed out above, it seems fair to say that Redhead has 
not managed to give support to the anti-mechanist thesis either.  
One of Redhead’s conclusions was that human minds can know the truth of 
statements which can be expressed in a system but cannot be proved in the system. This 
is hardly controversial, if one focuses on relatively weak systems, as Redhead does. For 
example, a simple model-theoretic argument shows that (∀x) [x + 1 ≠ x], which is an 
obvious truth about natural numbers, is not provable in Robinson Arithmetic Q. But this 
does not justify the conclusion that ‘certifiable truth outruns provability’ (neither would 
Redhead’s main argument, were it successful, justify it). It only shows that Q is in many 
ways a too weak theory, and that the proof of the sentence requires a stronger axiom 
system. It is still possible, and indeed quite plausible, that all humanly certifiable 
mathematical truths are provable in some comprehensive formal system.  
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Notes 
1  At one point (see p. 735), Redhead’s wording seems to suggest that Gödel’s theorem 
shows that there are true sentences of arithmetic which cannot be proved in any 
consistent, axiomatizable extension of Robinson Arithmetic. But of course it shows no 
such thing. It only shows that no such extension can be complete. Different extensions 
have different undecidable Gödel sentences. In all likelihood, Redhead did not really 
intended to claim the contrary, but given his misleading formulation, this point is perhaps 
worth making.  
